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KINGDOM WITHOUT END? 
THE INEVITABLE EXPANSION OF  
RELIGIOUS SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS 
by 
B. Jessie Hill*
This Essay considers the concept of religious sovereignty, the right of reli-
gious institutions to order their own affairs, and the lack of “legitimate 
authority” for a state to intervene in these affairs. Courts must grant def-
erence to religious institutions with respect to their internal affairs, and 
this allows these institutions to avoid certain legal rules, based upon the 
First Amendment. For instance, the ministerial exception allows religious 
institutions to avoid employment discrimination claims. This and other 
exceptions have pervaded the court system in recent years, resulting in 
high-profile conflicts between religious institutions and federal laws, such 
as the Affordable Care Act. This Essay examines the divided or dual sov-
ereignty that exists within the United States because of religious sover-
eignty. This Essay argues that such religious sovereignty is problematic 
because it has no logical stopping point. Through examining Christian 
Legal Society v. Martinez, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & School v. EEOC, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, and 
Zubik v. Burwell, this Essay examines the indefinite expansion of reli-
gious sovereignty through religious institutions’ exemption from govern-
ment interference in its affairs and from generally applicable laws. This 
Essay also attempts to examine the causes of the expansion of religious 
sovereignty, and the problems associated with this expansion. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
This Essay considers the nature of religious sovereignty claims, and 
in particular, their tendency toward indefinite expansion. In using the 
term “religious sovereignty,” I am specifically referring to what is some-
times called a “jurisdictional” conception of the right of religious institu-
tions to order their internal affairs: that is, that the state inherently and 
absolutely lacks “legitimate authority” to intervene in the affairs of a reli-
gious institution.
1
 Thus, sovereignty claims are generally different in both 
nature and scope from claims that courts must exercise some degree of 
deference to religious institutions with respect to particular questions, or 
even that courts should avoid deciding particular kinds of questions 
(such as those touching on religious doctrine). In addition, sovereignty 
claims are also usually treated as distinct from claims by individuals or in-
stitutions to be exempt from a generally applicable law that burdens the 
claimant’s religious beliefs. 
Today, the notion that religious institutions possess inherent sover-
eignty is nonetheless largely embodied in the claims of religious institu-
tions to avoid certain legal rules—often, antidiscrimination rules—based 
on the First Amendment. For example, the ministerial exception, which 
is grounded in both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment, allows at least some religious institutions 
to avoid employment discrimination claims by its ministers.
2
 Moreover, 
arguments grounded in religious sovereignty have gained increasing sali-
ence in recent years, particularly as high-profile conflicts have arisen be-
tween the tenets of some religions and the requirements of some federal 
laws, such as antidiscrimination laws and the Affordable Care Act. 
But claims of religious sovereignty are much older than the Constitu-
tion itself. Proponents of the notion that religious institutions possess a 
1
See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) An Exposition, 
Translation, and Defense, 21 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 33, 41–44 (2013); Paul Horwitz, 
Act III of the Ministerial Exception, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 973, 978 (2012); Gregory A. 
Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the Ministerial Exception, 
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 43, 
54–55 (2008); Howard M. Wasserman, Essay, Prescriptive Jurisdiction, Adjudicative 
Jurisdiction, and the Ministerial Exemption, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. Pennumbra 289, 297–98 
(2012). 
2
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 
188–89 (2012) (“By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free 
Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and 
mission through its appointments. According the state the power to determine which 
individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which 
prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.”). 
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special form of autonomy that grants them immunity from secular regu-
lation often reach back as far as the Middle Ages for their precedents.
3
 
These origins were explicitly theological in nature, drawing on the view 
of Pope Gelasius I from the Roman Empire that there were two powers in 
the world, the secular and the religious, each of which was supreme in its 
own domain.
4
 However, the notion of separate spheres of power was as 
much a product of power struggles between spiritual and secular authori-
ties as it was a product of religious conviction.
5
 
Moving forward in time, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC—the first Supreme 
Court case to officially recognize the ministerial exception—referred to 
the entanglements of, and struggles between, the English monarchy and 
the church in the 16th and 17th centuries, which provided the impetus 
for the Puritans to come to America and establish their own churches in 
New England.
6
 Indeed, Protestantism had adopted the “two-kingdoms 
theology,” according to which separate but overlapping secular and spir-
itual authorities were willed by God; this Protestant view helped to shape 
early American political philosophy, including the more simplified no-
tion of “separation” of church and state.
7
 
This basic, highly influential theory of divided or dual sovereignty of-
ten serves as a justification for what is now generally referred to as a right 
of institutional autonomy.
8
 Yet, several scholars have also strongly criti-
cized either the premises underlying, or the consequences flowing from, 
dual sovereignty as a basis for affording legal immunities to religious in-
stitutions.
9
 This Essay, too, criticizes the notion of religious sovereignty 
but takes a slightly different tack, arguing that such sovereignty is prob-
lematic because it has no logical stopping point, and that the lack of limi-
tation is inherent to sovereignty claims. 
3
Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation, and the 
Ministerial Exception, Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 106, 179–80 (2011). 
4
Paul Horwitz, Freedom of the Church Without Romance, 21 J. Contemp. Legal 
Issues 59, 67–68 (2013); see Brian Tierney, Religious Rights: A Historical Perspective, in 
Religious Liberty in Western Thought 29, 34–36 (Noel B. Reynolds & Cole W. 
Durham, Jr. eds., 1996); John D. Inazu, The Freedom of the Church (New Revised Standard 
Version), 21 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 335, 361 (2013). 
5
Horwitz, supra note 4, at 74. 
6
Hosanna-Tabor, 134 U.S. at 182. 
7
Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 
1, 17 (2000). 
8
See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 1, at 44; Horwitz, supra note 4, at 95; Wasserman, 
supra note 1, at 291. 
9
See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Religious 
Freedom and the Constitution 1–21 (2007); Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate 
Religion? 54–67 (2013); Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious 
Institutionalism, 99 Va. L. Rev. 917, 932 (2013).  
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This Essay proceeds as follows. Part II briefly traces a trajectory of re-
cent Supreme Court cases dealing with claims of institutional autonomy 
by religious groups in varying contexts, from Christian Legal Society v. Mar-
tinez, through Hosanna-Tabor, and ending—at least for now—with Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores and the still-unresolved Zubik v. Burwell. It also
demonstrates the tendency of religious sovereignty claims to expand in-
definitely, leading to an apparent merger of two previously distinct types
of legal claims: the claims of religious institutions of a right to the inter-
nal ordering of their affairs, free from governmental interference, and
claims of religious individuals or entities to exemptions from generally
applicable laws. Part III then attempts to identify some causes of this con-
vergence and expansion, attempting to demonstrate that the nature of
sovereignty itself makes delimitation of such autonomy claims difficult or
impossible.
II. RELIGIOUS SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS: A TRAJECTORY
It is possible to trace a trajectory through recent Supreme Court cas-
es in which an organization has asserted a right, as a religious institution, 
to autonomous ordering of its internal affairs. It is a trajectory both of in-
creasing sympathy on the part of the Court toward such claims, as well as 
of expanding scope for the autonomy claims. The four cases that belong 
in this trajectory—Christian Legal Society,  Hosanna-Tabor, Hobby Lobby, and 
Zubik—are doctrinally dissimilar. They involve claims under various con-
stitutional and statutory rubrics, including the Free Speech, Freedom of 
Association, Free Exercise Clause, and Establishment Clauses, and the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). They are, however, united by 
a common thread of argument—namely, that religious institutions, be-
cause of their religious identity, are to some extent immune from regula-
tion by the secular state. 
A. Christian Legal Society v. Martinez
In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, a religious student group claimed
a right both to be recognized as an official student organization by the 
University of California at Hastings (a public institution) and to exclude 
gays and lesbians, whose presence, they claimed, would undermine their 
message and identity due to the group’s opposition to “unrepentant ho-
mosexual conduct.”
10
 The Christian Legal Society (CLS) asserted a slew 
of constitutional claims when the university found that the group violated 
a school policy requiring that all student groups, to be officially recog-
nized and share in certain benefits, must accept any student who sought 
10
561 U.S. 661, 672 (2010). 
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to join.
11
 In particular, CLS claimed violations of its free speech rights, 
free exercise rights, and right to freedom of association.
12
 The Supreme 
Court focused primarily on the free speech claim, finding CLS’s free ex-
ercise claim to be weak and its association claim to be subsumed under 
the same analytical framework as the speech claim.
13
 Applying public-
forum analysis, the Court held that Hastings had created a “limited” pub-
lic forum with its student organizations program and that, under the 
standards of reasonableness and viewpoint-neutrality required for such 
forums, Hastings’s all-comers requirement passed constitutional muster, 
even when applied to a religious group such as CLS.
14
 
CLS is thus a case about the free-speech and association rights of re-
ligious organizations, and specifically about whether they can be forced 
to comply with nondiscrimination requirements that violate their reli-
gious tenets as a condition of receiving official recognition and subven-
tion. It may also be seen more generally as a case about the autonomy 
rights of religious organizations—their right to make membership deci-
sions, and to apply and enforce their own rules and regulations, even if 
those rules conflict with those of the state. Indeed, although CLS itself 
did not put forward an institutional-autonomy argument, some amici did. 
For example, the amicus brief of the American Center for Law and Jus-
tice and others drew on Supreme Court cases affirming the rights of reli-
gious institutions to order their internal affairs in arguing that religious 
groups have the right to “exert control over religious doctrine and the 
conduct of adherents.”
15
 Similarly, the amicus brief of the U.S. Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops argued that “the Constitution divests the gov-




The Court’s holding in CLS was limited to the narrow issue of 
whether a religious group that disapproved of homosexual conduct was 
entitled to official school recognition while excluding gay members in 
contravention of school policy. The reasoning of CLS suggests a poten-
tially broader scope, however. It is hard to see how or why the right as-
 
11
Id. at 673. It is questionable whether this description of Hastings’s rule is an 




Id. at 683, 697 n.27. 
14
Id. at 688–90. 
15
Brief for Amici Curiae American Center for Law and Justice et al. in Support 
of Petitioner at 12, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010) (No. 08-
1371), 2010 WL 497336 (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728–29 (1871), and 
Serbian E. Orthodox Church v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714–15 (1976)).  
16
Brief Amicus Curiae of U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops in Support of 
Petitioner at 14, Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010) (No. 08-1371), 
2010 WL 565210 (citing Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an 
Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 Vill. L. Rev. 273, 292–93 (2008)). 
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serted by CLS to exclude particular groups of people from membership 
in its club can be limited to homosexuals, or even to mere membership 
in the organization. It is not clear, for example, why religious groups 
cannot prevent gays and lesbians from merely attending their events, 
since such attendance could also be construed to affect the group’s au-
tonomy to function in accordance with its beliefs and to interfere with 
the relationships among its members.
 17
 Moreover, there is no obvious 
reason why—where such autonomy claims are concerned—sexual orien-
tation (or religion) should be the only permissible category for exclu-
sion. By their nature, claims to autonomous functioning tend to assume 
that courts cannot judge the validity or invalidity of the reasons why a 
group seeks to exclude someone. 
Ultimately, however, the Court rejected CLS’s effort and applied a 
relatively deferential standard to the public university’s regulation of 
CLS’s membership rules.
18
 Thus, in the first step of the trajectory, the 
Court considered but largely limited a strong claim to institutional au-
tonomy by a religious organization. 
B. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court officially recognized the minis-
terial exception.
19
 Though in some ways a potentially sweeping decision,
20
 
Hosanna-Tabor was in other ways a modest step in the direction of recog-
nizing religious sovereignty. It recognized a rule of law that lower courts 
had assumed to exist for decades,
21
 and the facts of Hosanna-Tabor put it 
very close to the heartland of that rule. Hosanna-Tabor dealt with the right 
of a church to fire a teacher in its school, who had also been trained and 
elected as a minister. The teacher claimed that she was illegally fired 
based on her disability, but the Court declined to look behind the 
church’s employment decision, holding that the employment decisions 
of a church with respect to its ministers are immunized from judicial re-
17
Cf. Alan Brownstein & Vikram Amar, Reviewing Associational Freedom Claims in a 
Limited Public Forum: An Extension of the Distinction Between Debate-Dampening and Debate-
Distorting State Action, 38 Hastings Const. L.Q. 505, 527 (2011) (“But a right to 
exclude individuals from becoming members of an association because they hold 
unacceptable beliefs could reasonably extend to placing exclusionary limits on 
attendance at an association’s programs as well.”). 
18
Martinez, 561 U.S. at 664. 
19
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 
196 (2012). 
20
See, e.g., Zoë Robinson, Hosanna-Tabor After Hobby Lobby, in The Rise of 
Corporate Religious Liberty 173, 173–74 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016). 
21
See, e.g., Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 307-08 (3d Cir. 2006); EEOC 
v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1996); McClure v. Salvation Ar-
my, 460 F.2d 553, 558–60 (5th Cir. 1972).
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view.
22
 The Court did not, however, delimit the scope of that holding. 
Although it is clear that the exception applies only to ministers, it left 
unanswered the question of how to determine who is a minister, as well 
as what kinds of institutions and what causes of action are immunized 
from judicial review.
23
 It gave only a nonexhaustive list of cases where the 
exception would not apply, such as where a case involved a criminal pros-
ecution or harm to minors.
24
 
Thus, in some important respects, the unanimous opinion in Hosan-
na-Tabor represents an expansion of religious sovereignty. As Professor 
Michael Stokes Paulsen views it, “[t]he Court . . . made clear that the 
right itself is one of religious community autonomy, broadly understood. 
It is not a right limited to pastors alone.”
25
 Moreover, this right is ground-
ed in both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment; thus, it cannot be changed or trumped by ordinary 
legislative action.
26
 Drawing a connection, as this Essay does, between Ho-
sanna-Tabor and CLS, Professor Paulsen argues that Hosanna-Tabor “has 
important consequences beyond direct employment regulation through 
anti-discrimination laws. Student religious groups, at state university 
campuses and at public schools, are religious communities, too. So are 
para-church ministries and many other types of religious organizations”; 
as such, they all share in “the right to control the selection of those who 
personify their beliefs, and to shape their own faith and mission through 
their decisions.”
27
 Admittedly, Paulsen’s reading is intentionally broad 
and, one might suggest, optimistic. It is nonetheless a plausible under-
standing of Hosanna-Tabor and its broader implications. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court made it clear that the ministerial ex-
ception existed outside of, and separate from, the framework set forth in 
Employment Division v. Smith for deciding whether a religious claimant is 
entitled to an exemption from a law that substantially burdens that 
claimant’s religious exercise.
28
 Smith held that no exemption is required 
when a neutral law of general applicability incidentally burdens religious 
 
22
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196. 
23
Id. at 188, 190, 193. 
24
Id. at 196. 
25
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Hosanna in the Highest!, Pub. Discourse (Jan. 13, 
2012), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/01/4541. See generally Andrew 
Koppelman, “Freedom of the Church” and the Authority of the State, 21 J. Contemp. Legal 
Issues 145, 148, 152 (2013) (questioning whether the Court went this far in Hosanna-
Tabor while also noting: “The power that Hosanna-Tabor gives to churches is sobering. 
The Court construed ‘minister’ pretty broadly, and some lower courts have gone even 
further.”). 
26
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188–89. 
27
Paulsen, supra note 25. 
28
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 189–90. 
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exercise.
29
 Although antidiscrimination laws such as the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, at issue in Hosanna-Tabor, are neutral laws of general ap-
plicability, the Court distinguished Smith in Hosanna-Tabor by stating that 
Smith applied to “government regulation of only outward physical acts,” 
whereas the ministerial exception applies to “internal church decision[s] 
that affect[] the faith and mission of the church itself.”
30
 The Court thus 
reaffirmed Smith outside the ministerial exception context and main-
tained the longstanding distinction between claims of religious individu-
als or entities to an exemption from a generally applicable law (“consci-
entious objection” claims), and claims of religious institutions to a right 
of noninterference in their internal affairs (“church autonomy” claims).
31
 
C. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and Zubik v. Burwell 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and its sequel, Zubik v. Burwell, arguably repre-
sent a further expansion of the Supreme Court’s recognition and ac-
ceptance of religious sovereignty. Although those cases arise under a fed-
eral statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and 
therefore do not share in the constitutional status of Hosanna-Tabor, they 
nonetheless resemble that decision in several respects. In particular, they 
can be understood as cases recognizing the rights of a broader range of 
organizations than ever before to engage in autonomous ordering of 
their internal employment affairs.
32
 
In Hobby Lobby, the Court held that RFRA required an accommoda-
tion for at least some large, for-profit corporations whose owners object-
ed on religious grounds to complying with a federal regulation requiring 
them to extend coverage for all prescription contraceptives to their em-
ployees.
33
 Under RFRA, the federal government may not substantially 
burden a person’s religious exercise unless it is advancing a compelling 
 
29
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990). 
30
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190. 
31
This distinction was first set forth by Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory 
of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church 
Autonomy, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1373, 1389–90 (1981). 
32
Interestingly, Professor Michael McConnell identified this potential expansion 
of Hosanna-Tabor in 2012, well before the Hobby Lobby decision came down: 
For example, what implications does Hosanna-Tabor have for the current 
controversy over the federal government’s decision to require religious 
employers that provide health insurance for their employees to include 
contraceptive services, including sterilization and abortifacient drugs, free of 
cost? Is this an “internal church decision”? It constitutes a mandatory term in the 
contract between the religious organization and its employees, which looks 
“internal,” and it certainly affects “faith and mission.”  
Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 821, 
835 (2012) (footnote omitted).  
33
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2784–85 (2014).  
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government interest, using the least restrictive means to do so.
34
 Accord-
ing to the five-Justice Hobby Lobby majority, the federal contraceptive 
mandate substantially burdened Hobby Lobby’s exercise of religion be-
cause it required the company either to engage in conduct that violated 
its sincere religious beliefs or to pay a very substantial fine.
35
 Although the 
Court did not decide the question of whether the government interest 
underlying the mandate was compelling, it nonetheless held that the 
mandate violated RFRA because it was not the least restrictive means the 
government could use to advance its interest in ensuring women’s cost-
free access to contraception.
36
 The Court noted that the government had 
already extended accommodations to nonprofit entities seeking to avoid 
the mandate on the same ground as Hobby Lobby, and therefore that rep-
licating this accommodation for for-profit companies would “not impinge 
on the plaintiffs’ religious belief that providing insurance coverage for 
the contraceptives at issue here violates their religion, [while serving] 
HHS’s stated interests equally well.”
37
 
The plaintiff for-profit companies in Hobby Lobby did not frame the 
case as raising questions of religious sovereignty; rather, it was presented 
as a case about the right of one entity to an exemption from a generally 
applicable law. However, viewed from another angle, Hobby Lobby begins 
to look like an expansion of Hosanna-Tabor to the context of for-profit 
corporations. Arguably, Hobby Lobby vindicated the rights of religious em-
ployers to order their own internal affairs—to govern autonomously the 
terms of their relationships with their employees. As Professor 
McConnell puts it, the required contraceptives insurance “constitutes a 
mandatory term in the contract between the religious organization and 




Of course, there are important doctrinal differences between the 
church’s claim under the ministerial exception and Hobby Lobby’s claim 
under RFRA. The ministerial exception is constitutional, whereas RFRA 
is only a statute—albeit a kind of “super-statute” that governs other fed-
eral statutes as well as executive actions.
39
 Perhaps more importantly, the 
ministerial exception provides a form of immunity that prevents courts 
from intervening in certain employment decisions, whatever the reason 
 
34
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to bb-4 (2012), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
35
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779. 
36
Id. at 2780, 2782. 
37
Id. at 2782. 
38
McConnell, supra note 32 at 835. 
39
William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, Duke L.J. 1215, 1230 
(2001). 
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for those decisions.
40
 Once the court decides that a minister is involved 
and that the type of employment decision falls within the scope of the 
exception, it can go no further; it does not consider the possibility of pre-
text or balance the employer’s interest against the government’s.
41
 Under 
RFRA, by contrast, there is a balancing test: the substantial burden on the 
claimant’s religious exercise can be outweighed by a compelling interest, 
if the regulation is sufficiently narrowly tailored.
42
 Finally, the ministerial 
exception applies, by its terms, only to “ministers,” and therefore appears 
to have a definite internal limit: it is relevant only to claims arising from 
the relationship between a religious employer and, presumably, a rela-
tively high-level employee.
43
 RFRA applies whenever a government regu-
lation imposes a substantial burden on an individual or entity and is 
therefore not limited to certain types of employment relationships. 
Yet, Hobby Lobby’s facts, and their treatment by the Court, share many 
characteristics of a ministerial exception case. First, as noted above, alt-
hough a RFRA claim is merely a statutory claim, the rights created by the 
statute trump the rights contained in all other federal laws, so RFRA 
functions in a quasi-constitutional manner. Second, the case involved an 
institutional rather than an individual claimant, whose request for ac-
commodation would affect other individuals within the corporation and 
whose interests were not represented by the corporation’s. This scenario 
resembles a ministerial exception case more than the typical free exercise 
claim for an exemption.
44
 To be sure, it is not unheard of for an institu-
tional claimant to assert a free-exercise right to an exemption from a 
generally applicable law that would adversely affect others within the in-
stitution. For example, in the 1982 case United States v. Lee, an Amish for-
profit employer sought an exemption from paying Social Security taxes 
on behalf of his employees.
45
 And in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. 
Secretary of Labor, a nominally non-profit religious corporation engaged in 
commercial activities argued that the Free Exercise Clause protected it 
from having to comply with the wage requirements of the Fair Labor 
 
40
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 
188 (2012); see also McConnell, supra note 32, at 825. 
41
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194–95; see also Koppelman, supra note 25, at 147. 
42
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
43
Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2012 WL 1068165, at *4 
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012). 
44
See, for example, Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and Sherbert 
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), two often cited, archetypal free exercise cases involving 
individuals seeking exemptions from generally applicable legal rules. Arguably, 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), another archetypal free exercise case, 
involved the claim of a religious organization (the Old Order Amish) to an 
exemption that would have an impact on certain members of the community who 
were not represented in the case (the children). The Court, however, did not appear 
to view the case in this way. Id. at 230–31. 
45
455 U.S. 252, 255 (1982). 
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Standards Act.
46
 Prior to Hobby Lobby, however, such claims were largely 
unsuccessful.
47
 Third, like Hosanna-Tabor and Hobby Lobby, the claim in-
volved an aspect of the employment relationship, and thus matters inter-
nal to the organization.  
Moreover, the Court was extremely deferential to Hobby Lobby on 
the issue of whether the contraceptive coverage mandate constituted a 
substantial burden on its religious exercise, giving it what amounted to a 
broad immunity rather than a limited right to an exemption. The Court 
refused to consider the attenuated nature of the claimed religious viola-
tion as a factor in the “substantial burden” prong under RFRA.
48
 Yet the 
connection between Hobby Lobby’s owner’s beliefs and the violation was 
in fact quite remote. Hobby Lobby’s owners objected to covering certain 





471 U.S. 290, 303 (1985); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(b), 207(a), 211(c), 
215(a)(2), (a)(5). 
47
 Lee, 455 U.S. at 261; Tony & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 303; see also Fred-
erick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception 
Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 
343, 359 (2014) (discussing Lee and Alamo as exemplars of the tenet that accommoda-
tions were unacceptable under pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence if they shifted 
heavy burdens onto third parties, such as employees). A pre-Hosanna-Tabor RFRA 
claim by an organization was successful in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente de 
Uniao Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). The institutional claimant in O Centro was a reli-
gious sect rather than a for-profit employer, however, and it desired accommoda-
tion—allowing it to use an otherwise prohibited substance for religious purposes—
that benefitted rather than burdened members of that organization. Id. at 439. 
Thanks to Jim Oleske for raising these points. 
48
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2777–78 (2014). 
49
Id. at 2759. Courts have been consistently deferential to free exercise plaintiffs 
on the nature and sincerity of their religious beliefs. Thomas v. Review Board of 
Indiana Emp. Div. Sec., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981). The question whether a 
government action imposes a substantial burden on those religious beliefs is a 
separate one, however, which need not be handled deferentially. See, e.g., id. at 717–
18 (considering the question of substantial burden on the petitioner’s religious 
beliefs separately, after deferring to the petitioner on the nature of those beliefs); see 
also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700–01 & n.6 (1986) (rejecting a claim for a religious 
exemption from the government’s use of a Social Security number in assigning 
benefits as not burdening the claimant’s unquestionably sincere religious beliefs, and 
noting that “for the adjudication of a constitutional claim, the Constitution, rather 
than an individual's religion, must supply the frame of reference”). In his 
contribution to this Symposium, Professor Marc DeGirolami argues, by contrast, that 
courts have long been highly deferential to plaintiffs’ assertions that government 
conduct burdens their religion, and he notes that in cases decided between 2011 and 
2015, federal appellate courts found the substantial burden requirement satisfied at a 
rate of over 2 to 1. Marc O. DeGirolami, Religious Accommodation, Religious Tradition, 
and Political Polarization, 20 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1127, 1137 & n.48 (2017). This 
certainly indicates a high success rate for RFRA claimants, but it does not necessarily 
indicate a lack of serious judicial inquiry into the matter. 
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believed them to be abortifacients because they believed that life, and 
therefore pregnancy, begins at conception, and because they had reason 
to think that these drugs and devices might, in some unknown and likely 
unknowable number of cases, have the effect of preventing pregnancy by 
preventing a fertilized egg from implanting in the uterus.
50
 They had no 
objection to other forms of contraception that did not operate in this 
manner.
51
 Yet, even if this effect occurred in some number of cases, it re-
quired the intervention of several actions by independent actors whose 
conduct Hobby Lobby did not and could not control.
52
 Regardless, the 
Court declined to scrutinize Hobby Lobby’s claim of substantial burden, 
relying heavily on the size of the financial penalty imposed for the failure 
to comply and otherwise taking Hobby Lobby’s claim entirely at face val-
ue. By essentially deferring away the “substantial burden” inquiry, the 
Court insulated important  aspects of the relationship between religious 
employers and employees from government regulation and searching ju-
dicial review, subject only to the government’s ability to pass an exacting 
version of strict scrutiny.
53
 
Indeed, although the Court attempted to cabin the scope of its deci-
sion, the logic of the majority opinion hinted at a much broader potential 
realm of application. For example, the Court insisted in dicta that its 
holding was not so expansive as to authorize employers to engage in race 
discrimination in violation of federal law, because there is a compelling 
government interest in eradicating race discrimination, and anti-
discrimination laws are narrowly tailored to that interest.
54
 Yet, it is not 
clear what, if any, other interests rise to such a level: the Hobby Lobby ma-
jority only assumed, without deciding, that the interest in providing cost-





 Similarly, the Court implicit-
ly ratified United States v. Lee, refusing to extend to a religious for-profit 
employer an exemption from paying Social Security taxes.
57
 But the ma-
jority had found with respect to the contraceptive mandate that it was a 
reasonable alternative for the government to exempt a small number of 
objecting employers and itself assume the cost of providing the benefit to 
 
50
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2763 n.7. 
51
Id. at 2765–66. 
52
Id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
53
Indeed, the Court’s application of strict scrutiny under RFRA was more 
exacting than it had been under pre-Smith free exercise precedents. See, e.g., id. at 
2803–06. 
54
Id. at 2783 (majority opinion). 
55
Sylvia A. Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 Wash. L. 
Rev. 363, 402 (1998). 
56
Id. at 2780. 
57
Id.; United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982). 
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the affected employees. There is no reason why a similar logic could not 
apply in the Social Security context, or the Fair Labor Standards Act con-
text; as Justice Ginsburg questioned in dissent, “[W]here is the stopping 
point to the ‘let the government pay’ alternative?”
58
 
Regarded in this light, Hobby Lobby can be seen as expanding the 
right of institutions to order their internal affairs, because it involved a 
for-profit corporation, which got similar treatment to non-profit religious 
institutions.
59
 At a minimum, it opens the possibility that for-profit corpo-
rations may be treated as religious institutions in other contexts.
60
 It 
could also be seen as largely immunizing the employer-employee rela-
tionship from scrutiny, even outside the narrow set of employees that 
could be considered ministerial. Viewed as an institutional autonomy 
case, Hobby Lobby potentially expands the category of unprotected “minis-
ters” to all employees of a religious corporation. 
Finally, Zubik v. Burwell, which the Court considered in its 2015 
Term, is the latest iteration of expanding sovereignty claims. Zubik con-
sidered RFRA claims by religious nonprofits that are by law exempt from 
the requirement to provide contraceptives coverage to their employees so 
long as they notify the government of their objection.
61
 Those nonprofits 
claimed that the very act of having to opt-out of the contraceptive man-
date imposed a substantial burden on their religious exercise, because it 
triggered contraceptive coverage by a third party, making the nonprofits 
complicit in the act of using contraception.
62
 The question whether these 
nonprofits have a valid RFRA claim remains unresolved, as the Supreme 
Court chose to remand the case for the parties and lower courts to con-
sider whether a compromise could be reached “that accommodates peti-
tioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women 
covered by petitioners’ health plans receive full and equal health cover-
age, including contraceptive coverage.”
63
 Thus, it is difficult to say wheth-
er the Court will continue to expand the scope of religious institution 
sovereignty. 
Still, the claims of the nonprofits clearly seek that further expansion 
of religious sovereignty. First, as Professor Caroline Mala Corbin demon-
58
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
59
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768–69 (majority opinion). To be fair, of course, this 
was the Court’s interpretation of RFRA’s language and not some broader 
constitutional or existential holding regarding the nature of religious institutions.  
60
Cf. Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 
21 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 59, 92 (exploring the proposition that “Free Exercise rights 
are not limited only to those entities permitted to hire and fire based on religion 
under Title VII, and that profit making is simply one factor among many that should 
be considered under Title VII”). 
61




Id. at 1561 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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strates, the nonprofits have doubled down on their claim that they are 
entitled to almost absolute deference from the courts on the question of 
whether the opt-out imposes a substantial burden on their religious exer-
cise: “They assert that once a religious objector claims that a particular 
statutory requirement amounts to a substantial burden as a matter of re-
ligious belief, then, as long as they are sincere, it amounts to a substantial 
burden under RFRA as a matter of law.”
64
 This conflates the sincerity and 
substantial burden prongs of the RFRA inquiry, making a RFRA claim 
easier for plaintiffs to make out. Moreover, at oral argument, the attor-
neys for the nonprofits spoke of the federal government as “hijack[ing]” 
their health-care plans.
65
 Such language suggests a right to proprietary 
control over the plans themselves and over the employee benefits—which 
are in reality not just under the sole jurisdiction of employers, but rather 
are and long have been heavily regulated by law.
66
 A strong sense of sov-
ereignty thus pervades the nonprofits’ claims in Zubik. But perhaps the 
clearest expansion of the sovereignty claim is demonstrated by the scope 
of the remedy those nonprofits apparently seek. It seems that, by attempt-
ing to ensure that they will play no part whatsoever in their employees’ 
acquisition of contraception, they essentially seek complete exemption 
from the regulation, if not nullification of the regulation itself. This 
“step-by-step” strategy of seeking greater and greater distance from regu-
lation—according to which for-profit businesses first sought the accom-
modation accorded to nonprofits, then nonprofits sought the complete 
exemption accorded only to churches—demonstrates the expanding 
scope of the sovereignty claims.
67
 Yet, the carve-out from regulation that 
these nonprofits seek (and that for-profit businesses may well seek after 
them, if the nonprofits are successful) will almost certainly compromise 
the ability of “secretaries, janitors, and teachers” employed by religious 





Caroline Mala Corbin, Deference to Claims of Substantial Religious Burden, 2016 U. 
Ill. L. Rev. Online 10, 13, https://illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ 
Corbin.pdf (footnote omitted) (citing Brief for Petitioners at 2, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 
S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (Nos. 15–35, 15–105, 15–119, 15–191)). 
65
Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 891 (2016) 
(No. 14-1418). 
66
Cf. Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1453 (2015). 
Sepper discusses this phenomenon in terms of Lochnerian resistance to 
redistribution and pervasive regulation. Id. at 1463–64. 
67
This stepwise strategy is concisely described by Professor Leslie Griffin. Leslie 
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D. Summary: The Expansion of Sovereignty Claims in the Supreme Court and 
Lower Courts 
Although the cases described above have treated disparate doctrinal 
issues, they are united by the religious claimants’ arguments for sover-
eignty with respect to their internal affairs. Moreover, they demonstrate 
an increasingly robust understanding by religious institutions and the 
Supreme Court of that sovereignty and its scope. The right to internal 
sovereignty has been extended beyond a narrow class of individuals ex-
plicitly trained, elected, or denominated as “ministers” to all employees 
of a religious institution.
69
 The types of organizations that can claim reli-
gious autonomy rights include not just churches, or even their affiliated 
nonprofits, but also large, for-profit corporations. The scope of sover-
eignty seemingly embraces not only the hiring and firing of organiza-
tional leaders, but the entirety of the employment relationship. 
Is it fair to say that the claims of all of the organizations in the above-
described cases are claims to sovereignty, as opposed to mere deference 
or freedom from unwarranted state intrusions? It seems to me that this 
label is fairly applied to institutional-autonomy claims discussed here. 
They are claims of entitlement not just to deference, but to almost com-
plete noninterference with certain aspects of institutional life. They imply 
incompetence of the courts to intervene, even on behalf of those within 
the institution who seek that intervention. 
Professor Michael McConnell has concisely set out some attributes 
that pertain to sovereignty by private entities (or “non-state govern-
ance”). He suggests that such non-state governance generally entails: (1) 
entry into the organization by means that are not entirely voluntary; (2) 
exit from the organization that is either not permitted or carries enor-
mous costs; (3) creation of rules that are specific to the organization; and 




Where religious organizations are concerned, the creation and en-
forcement of a separate set of rules is exactly the accommodation power 
sought vis-à-vis the government. Moreover, although relationships be-
tween religious employers and employees are generally treated as volun-
tary, there is reason to be wary of the panacea of supposed voluntariness, 
which may be more wishful thinking than reality.
71
 The cost of departure 
 
69
See Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(“[C]ourts have considered a particular employee to be a ‘minister’ for purposes of 
the ministerial exception based on the function of the plaintiff’s employment 
position rather than the fact of ordination.”). 
70
Michael W. McConnell, Non-State Governance, 2010 Utah L. Rev. 7, 9 (2010). 
71
See, e.g., B. Jessie Hill, Change, Dissent, and the Problem of Consent in Religious 
Organizations, in The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty, supra note 20, at 419, 
421, 425–26. 
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from religious employment, which may (as in the case of Hosanna-Tabor) 
be accompanied by the loss of other religious status or even membership, 
can be exceedingly high for individuals.
72
 And as Professor Elizabeth 
Sepper has pointed out, talismanic invocations of voluntariness in the 
employment context may lead to a Lochner-esque slippery slope of dereg-
ulating the employment relationship almost entirely.
73
 
In minimizing the distinction between exemption claims and inter-
nal autonomy claims, the expansion of sovereignty claims may ultimately 
undermine to some extent the Supreme Court’s holding in Employment 
Division v. Smith, which rejected the constitutional entitlement to exemp-
tions from generally applicable laws. As the class of entities that can claim 
autonomy from regulation expands beyond churches, and the range of 
affected employees extends beyond a small class of church leaders, and 
the sorts of claims that courts are incompetent to hear come to encom-
pass all claims arising from the employment relationship, the so-called 
“ministerial exception” starts to look like a generalized exemption from 
regulation for religiously-oriented employers. Likewise, given the enor-
mous scope of deference granted by Hobby Lobby to religious claimants on 
the question of substantial burden, claims to an accommodation or ex-
emption from regulation begin to take on the quality of sovereignty 
claims, delineating a realm of employment activity into which neither the 
legislature nor the courts can intervene. 
Indeed, such expansive claims to sovereignty are hardly unheard of 
in the lower courts.
74
 In fact, it is worth noting that the first case to rec-
ognize a form of the ministerial exception did so in the context of a 
claim by a female secretary in the Public Relations Department of the 
Salvation Army, a religious charitable organization, that she had been 
paid less than similarly-situated male employees.
75
 It thus involved neither 
a church nor a minister, strictly speaking. More recently, religious em-
ployers have tried to claim that even non-coreligionists had the status of 
ministers, in order to assert the ministerial exception.
76
 And numerous 
 
72
Id. at 426. 
73
Sepper, supra note 66, at 1461, 1466–67; see also Caroline Mala Corbin, 
Corporate Religious Liberty, 30 Const. Comment. 277, 280, 300–01 (2015) (questioning 
the voluntariness of the employment relationship). 
74
This Essay does not claim that such expansive sovereignty claims in lower 
courts have increased in the wake of Hosanna-Tabor and Hobby Lobby. This is a 
plausible thesis, but one that would require empirical testing that is beyond the scope 
of the project undertaken here. 
75
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 555–56 (5th Cir. 1972). Admittedly, 
neither the Salvation Army’s status as a “church” nor the plaintiff’s ministerial status 
was put into question by the parties. Id. at 556. 
76
Kant v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 587, 589 (Ky. 2014) 
(reversing the lower court’s holding that a Jewish professor at a Christian seminary 
was a minister); Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2012 WL 
1068165, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012) (rejecting a claim by a Catholic diocese that 
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nonchurch entities, such as hospitals, have attempted to claim the status 
of religious organizations entitled to invoke some form of institutional 
autonomy. For example, Methodist Healthcare, Inc., a hospital, success-
fully claimed the exception to avoid an Americans with Disabilities Act 
Claim by a resident in the hospital’s pastoral training program.
77
 In so 
upholding the exception, the Sixth Circuit noted that the ministerial ex-
ception “has been applied to claims against religiously affiliated schools, 
corporations, and hospitals by courts ruling that they come within the 
meaning of a ‘religious institution.’”
78
 
Beyond the ministerial exception, courts have long applied—and 
continue to apply vigorously—a doctrine of “ecclesiastical abstention,” a 
doctrine that seems to overlap somewhat with the ministerial exception 
but continues to apply in cases where the ministerial exception is irrele-
vant.
79
 According to an older Fifth Circuit case, the doctrine of ecclesias-
tical abstention expresses “[a] ‘spirit of freedom for religious organiza-
tions, an independence from secular control or minipulation [sic] in 
short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, mat-
ters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.’”
80
 This 
doctrine was recently applied in Means v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bish-
ops, in which the plaintiff—a patient of a Catholic Hospital—sued the di-
rectors of a hospital after she was denied medical information and access 
to care for a miscarriage due to the hospital’s religiously motivated poli-
cies regarding abortion.
81
 Rejecting this common-law negligence claim 
on various grounds, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Michigan added that the claim was also barred by ecclesiastical absten-
tion, because the court and jury could not “analyze [the hospital’s] duty, 
breach, or causation without reference to the text of the [Ethical and Re-
ligious Directives], which are an expression of Catholic doctrine.”
82
 This 
holding demonstrates not only that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine 
retains a scope of application independent of the ministerial exception, 
but also that the doctrine has been applied in a case involving a tort 
claim by a patient against a hospital, in which there was no question that 
the religious directives at issue were the source of the plaintiff’s injury 
a parochial school computer instructor, who was not Catholic, was nonetheless a 
minister). 
77
Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (2007). 
78
Id. (citing Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 
309–10 (4th Cir. 2004)). 
79
See, e.g., Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Simpson v. Wells 
Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974); Klouda v. Sw. Baptist Theological, 543 F. 
Supp. 2d 594 (N.D. Tex. 2008). 
80
Simpson, 494 F.2d at 493 (quoting Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116). 
81
No. 1:15-CV-353, 2015 WL 3970046, at *1–2 (W.D. Mich. June 30, 2015), 
affirmed, 836 F.3d 643 (6
th
 Cir. 2016). 
82
Id. at *11. 
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and therefore did not require interpretation or application.
83
 It is thus 
clear that at least some lower courts have construed Hosanna-Tabor as 
supplementing, but not limiting, the sovereignty already possessed by re-
ligious institutions under the doctrine of ecclesiastical abstention. 
III.  THE LIMITLESS NATURE OF SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS 
Is the tendency of sovereignty claims toward increasing scope and 
breadth a mere historically contingent fact? Or is there something inher-
ent in religious sovereignty claims that tends to encourage such envelope-
pushing? And if the latter is the case, what is it about such sovereignty 
claims that leads to their inevitable expansion? 
This Part proposes several reasons why religious sovereignty claims 
have an inherent tendency to expand in scope. First, the Supreme Court 
opinions upholding religious sovereignty, like many proponents of reli-
gious sovereignty, are vague in desribing the limits of those sovereignty 
rights. Second, because the kind of sovereignty claimed by religious or-
ganizations is one that overlaps with the sovereignty of civil society and 
that lacks physical boundaries, its borders are self-imposed and not clear-
ly defined. Indeed, religious sovereignty, which is often framed as a sort 
of privacy right, precludes inquiry into key border questions relevant to 
the application of the rule, such as who qualifies as a minister and the 
reasons for a particular employment decision. Third and finally, incen-
tives produced by litigation encourage defendants to raise sovereignty 
claims whenever possible. 
A. Unclear Doctrinal Boundaries 
As discussed above,
84
 the opinion in Hosanna-Tabor left numerous 
questions unanswered about the scope of its application. The Court did 
not clarify how courts were to determine who is a minister, what sorts of 
claims are immune from judicial review, or what sorts of institutions can 
claim the benefit of the ministerial exception. Nor did the Court explain 
how the ministerial exception interacts with the doctrine of ecclesiastical 
abstention. Similarly, Hobby Lobby opened the door to institutional free 
exercise claims by religious for-profit corporations, but it did not provide 
guidance on what sorts of for-profit entities might qualify for similar 
 
83
The Means court stated that adjudication of the plaintiff’s negligence claim 
would require determination of nuanced religious questions surrounding the circum-
stances under which abortion would be permissible under the Catholic hospital’s re-
ligious directives. Id. at *13. However, the hospital did not claim that the plaintiff’s 
care was in violation of the directives or that there was any question about whether 
they applied, so it was not apparent how interpretation of those directives was needed 
to resolve the plaintiff’s claim. Id. at *13–14. 
84
See supra Part II.B. 
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Likewise, advocates of robust sovereignty for religious institutions are 
generally not eager to set out clear limits on that sovereignty, and indeed, 
most of them have not done so. For example, Professor Richard Garnett, 
one of the most eloquent defenders of the “freedom of the church,” 
acknowledges “the apparent lack of a clear rule, prohibition, or principle 
connected to that doctrine,” but also finds that lack relatively untrou-
bling.
86
 And Professor Robert Vischer has argued that for-profit institu-
tions should be accorded free exercise rights, but perhaps not rights that 
are identical to those of churches and other core religious institutions; 
he thus argues that legislatures rather than courts are in the best position 
to determine the extent of those rights.
87
 
As a counter-example, Professors Carl Esbeck and Christopher Lund 
have both attempted to draw reasonable lines to delimit the scope of re-
ligious autonomy.
88
 Esbeck argues that the Hosanna-Tabor holding is lim-
ited to “the sphere of church governance, within which religious organi-
zations are truly autonomous.”
89
 He thus distinguishes cases dealing with 
a church’s position on political or social issues from decisions about a 
church’s organization and management.
90
 He does not, however, provide 
a principle for separating internal matters of governance from external 
matters, and he does not deal with more difficult questions involving en-
tities other than churches, such as large religious nonprofit organiza-
tions. Focusing instead on the nature of the rule from which the church 
seeks exemption, Lund argues that churches are largely immune from 
judicial interference with respect to claims by church members sounding 
85
See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2802–05 (2014) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted) (“And where is the stopping 
point to the ‘let the government pay’ alternative? Suppose an employer’s sincerely 
held religious belief is offended by health coverage of vaccines, or paying the 
minimum wage, or according women equal pay for substantially similar work? Does it 
rank as a less restrictive alternative to require the government to provide the money 
or benefit to which the employer has a religion-based objection?”). 
86
Garnett, supra note 1, at 45; see also Inazu, supra note 4, at 363–64 (noting the 
possible doctrinal extension of the “freedom of the church” without suggesting any 
doctrinal limits). 
87
Robert K. Vischer, Do For-Profit Businesses Have Free Exercise Rights?, 21 J. 
Contemp. Legal Issues 369, 397, 399 (2013) (“There are many good reasons to 
defend the autonomy of for-profit businesses seeking to maintain or cultivate a 
distinct religious identity. In most cases, though, legislatures are better suited to make 
judgments of calibration than courts are.”). 
88
See infra notes 89–93. 
89
Carl H. Esbeck, A Religious Organization’s Autonomy in Matters of Self-Governance: 
Hosanna-Tabor and the First Amendment, 13 Engage: J. Federalist Soc’y Prac. 
Groups 168, 170 (2012). 
90
Id. 
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in tort (what Lund calls “imposed legal obligations”) when their resolu-
tion would implicate “religious beliefs and practices.”
91
 At the same time, 
he argues that churches should largely be held to so-called “assumed ob-
ligations,” such as those involving contract and property.
92
 Yet, Lund, too, 
acknowledges that boundary issues are not easily resolved; he does not 
put forward a theory for resolving them.
93
 
The doctrinal scope of religious sovereignty, even after recent pro-
nouncements from the Supreme Court, thus remains remarkably un-
clear. To be sure, this criticism should not be overstated. Alone, the un-
certain contours of a legal doctrine should not be enough to condemn it, 
and it is not uncommon for the details of such a doctrine to be worked 
out over decades of constitutional common-law decision-making. None-
theless, the inability of both the Supreme Court and the advocates of re-
ligious sovereignty to set out principled boundaries for the concept 
should, at a minimum, provide cause for concern about the workability 
of the concept itself. 
B. No Physical Boundaries, but Categorical Ones
At the risk of obviousness, it nonetheless seems worth stating that the
concept of religious sovereignty is different from the usual concept of 
sovereignty—for example, with respect to nation-states—because the 
purported realm of sovereignty does not correspond to a delimited phys-
ical space. A religious organization does not have physical borders, and 
its sovereignty is not spatially defined or delimited. Rather, its sovereignty 
is over particular subject matter, and it overlaps in many respects with the 
sovereignty of the civil authority.
94
 Indeed, the origins of the call for 
“freedom of the church” arise as much from the struggle for political 
power as from a desire to avoid state intervention in religious affairs; this 
history demonstrates that religious sovereignty is a claim to the same 




Several aspects of religious sovereignty’s unique jurisdiction thus 
combine to create a distinct problem for containing the concept: the lack 
91
Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-
Tabor, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1183, 1201, 1203, 1216 (2014). 
92
Id. at 1220. 
93
Id. at 1203–04 (noting courts have split on the “boundary question” of who is 
an insider and who is an outsider of a Catholic school); id. at 1219 (“These problems 
cannot be solved; they can only be managed.”). 
94
See, e.g., Kalscheur, supra note 1, at 61. 
95
Id.; Horwitz, supra note 4, at 76 (“The king and his allies made their own 
theological arguments. Excommunication itself was as much a political as a religious 
weapon. And on both sides there was a tangle of political alliances and power 
relations.” (internal footnote omitted)). 
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of obvious, salient borders for the realm of sovereignty; the overlapping 
domain of the sovereignty, and the failure of courts and commentators to 
delimit the scope of sovereignty. Sovereigns usually possess the power to 
define the limits of their own sovereignty, subject only to other sover-
eigns’ superior claim (and ability to enforce it). In this respect, claims of 
religious sovereignty share the quality of arguments about the scope of a 
court’s jurisdiction—they are decided by the entity whose power is, itself, 
at stake.
96
 The “fox guarding the henhouse” problem is inescapable. This 
is the nature of sovereignty, and it is a problem that largely must be 
acknowledged and accepted when sovereigns are involved. But it high-
lights the extremely high stakes of affording a measure of sovereignty, as 
opposed to simply affording some deference to religious institutions on 
particular issues or engaging in a balancing process that is weighted in 
favor of religious institutions on particular issues. Once a non-state entity 
is given a measure of sovereignty, it can assert the authority to determine 
the scope of that sovereignty. Moreover, unlike democratic governments, 
non-state sovereigns are not necessarily subject to popular control, inter-
nal checks and balances, or enforceable individual rights. 
The self-defining power of religious sovereigns also transforms the 
concept of government intervention into a moving target. The firing of a 
church employee for a medical condition, in violation of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, and for reporting that violation, may appear to be a 
matter of civil rights, not internal church governance.
97
 But if the em-
ployee is designated a minister, and if the church has a doctrinal rule 
forbidding recourse to external civil authorities for resolution of dis-
putes, the conflict begins to look like an internal one.
98
 Indeed, if we are 
to take the notion of sovereignty seriously, it is hard to know how courts 
can even decide who is a “minister,” or whether an employment dispute 
involves one of “the church’s” religious tenets, since these are paradigm 






It also resembles the public-forum doctrine, according to which the 
government is given the power to define the purposes of a limited forum, and then is 
required only to regulate speech in accordance with those self-defined limits. See, e.g., 
Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under the Regulatory State, 
75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1541, 1593–94 (2008). 
97
Cf. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Narrative Pluralism and Doctrinal Incoherence in 
Hosanna-Tabor, 64 Mercer L. Rev. 405, 408–15 (2013). 
98
Cf. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor, 
20 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1265, 1276 (2017) (noting that Smith and Hosanna-Tabor 
“[b]oth . . . involve internal church activities”). 
99
Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 
171, 197 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that “[a] religious organization’s 
right to choose its ministers would be hollow . . . if secular courts could second-guess 
the organization’s sincere determination that a given employee is a ‘minister’ under 
the organization’s theological tenets”). 
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Indeed, whether institutional autonomy claims are framed as sover-
eignty claims or are framed instead as merely a “hands-off” doctrine—a 
sort of privacy right that allows religious entities to make certain deci-
sions autonomously and without interference—the problem is the 
same.
100
 Such claims are categorical, and they do not permit balancing. 
Creating a realm of nonintervention prevents inquiry into the reasons, 
the reasonableness, and the legitimacy or pretextual nature of religious 
organizations’ decisions. When religious organizations’ decisions are pro-
tected by such a shield, it is impossible, for example, to declare some rea-
sons for hiring and firing to be legally permissible—such as gender—and 
others legally impermissible—such as race. This inability to draw lines, 
which is quite different when a balancing approach is used, may not be 
seen as problematic when high-level ministerial employees of a church 
are involved. But when other kinds of religious organizations are in-
volved, and they extend the ministerial label well beyond the highest lev-
els of hierarchy within the organization, this categorical disability on the 
part of the civil authorities to enforce civil rights begins to look signifi-
cantly more troubling. 
C. Litigation Incentives 
Finally, one need not be a cynic to suggest that the prospect of litiga-
tion, and particularly that of civil rights litigation—with its attendant ex-
pense, potentially massive stakes, and adversarial nature—might encour-
age some defendants to push the boundaries of the already-hazy 
doctrines pertaining to religious autonomy and ecclesiastical abstention. 
The ministerial exception and the related ecclesiastical abstention doc-
trine are, as noted above, constitutional doctrines that function categori-
cally.
101
 No balancing or fact-finding is required; no legislative mandate 
can override them.
102
 RFRA can function similarly, at least when the 
Court appears willing to defer to religious claimants on the question of 
substantial burden, thus potentially putting the federal government to 
the burden of passing strict scrutiny with respect to every regulation chal-
lenged by a religious plaintiff.
103
 These doctrines thus present extraordi-
narily powerful tools for a defendant.  
The ministerial exception, which is an affirmative defense,
104
 is per-
haps particularly troubling in this way. A religious organization asserting 
 
100
See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What 
Are We Talking About?, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 837 (2009); Samuel J. Levine, The 
Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: An Introduction, 84 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 793 (2009); Lund, supra note 91, at 1197–98. 
101
See supra Part III.B.  
102
See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 25, at 163. 
103
See Corbin, supra note 64, at 13; Paulsen, supra note 25. 
104
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4. 
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the exception is already, by definition, on the defensive. This means, as 
well, that the plaintiff has already invited the court’s intervention into 
what is claimed to be an intra-religious dispute. The defendant’s best 
means to prevent protracted litigation is to cast the entire dispute as an 
internecine fight that should not be handled by the courts. Yet this pre-
cise context is far removed from the origins of the doctrine of “freedom 
of the church,” which arose from attempts by the secular sovereign to en-
ter into and control the affairs of the church.
105
 It did not arise in a con-
text in which some individual or faction within the church requested a 
civil remedy for a civil wrong perpetrated by a member of the church. As 
the Supreme Court stated in an early religious-autonomy case, Order of St. 
Benedict v. Steinhauser, court jurisdiction should generally not be withheld 




In a society that is increasingly polarized on the basis of religion and 
politics, there is perhaps no greater manifestation of that polarization 
than the claim to a realm entirely separate from, and independent of, the 
sovereignty of the civil state.
107
 Though institutional autonomy for reli-
gious organizations may itself be an important way of protecting civil 
rights, it also brings with it difficulties that are not easily resolved. Claims 
of sovereignty have a natural and nearly inevitable tendency to expand, 
potentially overcoming the notion that religiously-grounded exceptions 
and accommodations are, in fact, exceptional. There is also no room for 
balancing other state interests against these expanding and categorical 
claims to freedom from regulation by the civil state. 
The alternate approach, of course, is one in which the rhetoric of 
sovereignty and “freedom of the church” is abandoned altogether and 
which specifies carefully those issues that the courts may and may not de-
cide. For example, there already appears to be some degree of consensus 
that courts may decide who is and is not a minister subject to the ministe-
rial exception, although that question itself will in most cases—at least 
from the church’s perspective—involve core religious and theological is-
sues. By asserting that this issue can be decided from the perspective of 
civil society without excessively infringing the prerogatives of religious in-
stitutions and authorities, courts have demonstrated that other issues may 





See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
106
234 U.S. 640, 642–43 (1914). 
107
See, e.g., Robin West, Freedom of the Church and Our Endangered Civil Rights: 
Exiting the Social Contract, in The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty, supra note 
20, at 399, 399–418. 
108
The contribution of Professors Lupu and Tuttle reads Hosanna-Tabor as em-
bracing a similar approach to the one advocated here—though, in my view, that read-
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the federal courts have long asserted their competence to decide whether 
a government regulation constitutes a substantial burden on a plaintiff’s 
religious exercise in a line of cases from which the Supreme Court has 
only recently—and perhaps temporarily—departed.
109
 Thus, courts must 
abandon the path toward accepting sovereignty claims by religious insti-
tutions and embrace the power to decide what questions are and are not 
subject to Establishment Clause limitations on courts’ ability to decide 
issues involving religious doctrine; they must resist the temptation to fall 
back on formalistic categories or defer to religious institutions to define 
the scope of their own autonomy from judicial control. Such an ap-
proach would not only alleviate the difficulty of cabining religious sover-
eignty, it would also create room for balancing state interests against the 
free exercise rights of claimants, thereby allowing the courts to protect 
both. 
ing is somewhat optimistic. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 98, at 1277–79. They argue that 
Hosanna-Tabor prevents only the adjudication of particular issues that involve the 
uniquely ecclesiastical question of fitness for ministry, and they therefore read Hosan-
na-Tabor as a subset of, rather than a supplement to, the doctrine of ecclesiastical ab-
stention. Id. at 1291. 
109
Supra Part II.C. 
